Arkansas Supreme Court Holds Right to Jury Trial May Not Be Restricted Due to Failure to Comply with Scheduling Order

Case: Bandy v. Vick, 2020 Ark. 334

Trial Court: Pulaski County Circuit Court (Judge Timothy D. Fox)

Issue: May trial court presiding over medical practice case deny a party a jury trial as a sanction for failing to conduct mediation as required by its standard scheduling order?

Holding: No. The fundamental right to a trial by jury may only be denied under certain circumstances, none of which were present in the instant case.

Summary:

Mildred Vick sued Dr. Lawrence Bandy and his medical clinic on the basis that Bandy had committed medical negligence in the course of performing surgery on her. Her complaint included a demand for a trial by jury. The court entered its standard scheduling order, which contained a requirement that mediation be completed 30 days prior to the pretrial hearing date. The order set forth certain sanctions for noncompliance: “Failure to comply with the pre-trial requirements may result in removal from the jury trial docket, dismissal of claims, striking of affirmative defenses, or the prohibition of the introduction of certain testimony and/or exhibits.” Opinion at 2.

Due to a refusal by the doctor to authorize a settlement (a common issue in medical malpractice cases), the defense declined to participate in mediation. However, apparently due to inadvertence, they neglected to receive the court’s permission to do so, and filed an untimely motion to dispense with mediation. The court denied the motion and, following the plaintiff’s consent to a bench trial, denied the defendants a jury trial as a sanction.

Following a bench trial, the plaintiff received a judgment of over $800,000. On appeal, the defendants raised several arguments. Though they also raised arguments regarding the propriety of the finding of liability, their first point on appeal, and the issue on which the court ruled in their favor, was based on the denial of a jury trial:

For their first point on appeal, appellants contend that the circuit court erred by depriving them of their constitutional right to a trial by jury. They argue that the circuit court lacked the authority to do so when they had not waived their right to a jury trial in a manner prescribed by law, and further, that doing so under the circumstances of this case was also a denial of equal protection and due process guaranteed by the Arkansas Constitution and the United States Constitution.

Id. at 4.

The court began its analysis with the Arkansas Constitution provision guaranteeing the right to trial by jury:

The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law, without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law[.]

Id. at 4 (citing Ark. Const., art. 2, § 7) (alteration in opinion). The court then recognized that “the manner prescribed by law” has been held to include Arkansas statutory authority and the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.

The crucial questions were whether either: 1) Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 39(a), which sets forth “the ways a proper demand for a trial by jury may not result in a jury trial”, id. at 5, applied to these facts; or 2) Any statutory authority or principle of law allows a circuit court to deny a party a jury trial under these circumstances. The court answered both questions in the negative.

Rule 39(a) states that a demand for a jury trial may only be denied under two circumstances. Either all parties state that they wish for the case to be decided solely by a judge (which is known as a “bench trial”), or the court determines that the case is not one for which a jury trial is allowed:

When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the docket as a jury action. The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless (1) the parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury or (2) the court, upon motion or of its own initiative, finds that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist under the Constitution or statutes of this State.

The court held, without much difficulty, that neither provision was satisfied:

Of course, neither circumstance set out in Rule 39(a) applies here—the defense did not consent to a bench trial, and the medical malpractice claim is a legal claim to which the right of a jury trial attaches. Nor is there statutory authority for the striking of a jury-trial demand for failure to comply with a court order for mediation.

Opinion at 5.

The court also rejected the appellee’s argument that the trial court’s action was authorized by the dispute resolution statute or that the defendants consented to a bench trial by failing to abide by the scheduling order:

Vick contends in her brief that the Dispute Resolution Act, and particularly Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-7-202(e), vested in the circuit court the authority necessary to strike the jury demand in this case. But while section 16-7-202(e) gives courts the discretionary authority to “make at the request of a party appropriate orders to confirm and enforce the results produced by the dispute resolution process,” such authority clearly has no application in this case. The statute says nothing about the court’s authority to impose sanctions for failing to mediate as ordered. We likewise reject Vick’s argument that appellants’ actions in refusing to mediate and delay in seeking relief from compliance with the scheduling order constituted “consent” to the withdrawal of the jury trial demand.

Id. at 5-6. The court concluded:

Based on our analysis above, there is no law prescribing a waiver of the right to a jury trial as a sanction for failing to comply with a court’s order to mediate. Accordingly, on this record, we hold that the circuit court lacked the authority to divest appellants of their fundamental constitutional right to a jury trial. While this court has made clear that trial courts have considerable discretion in the control and management of proceedings before them, Lagios v. Goldman, 2016 Ark. 59, at 14, 483 S.W.3d 810, 819, that discretion is not unlimited. Here, the circuit court erred in striking the defendants’ jury-trial demand as a sanction for failing to mediate as required by the scheduling order; we are persuaded that the sanction imposed here—deprivation of the fundamental constitutional right to a trial by jury—was beyond the circuit court’s authority.

Id. at 6. The court therefore reversed and remanded for a new trial. Because this issue was dispositive, the court declined to address the appellants’ other arguments.

Interestingly, three justices (Hart, Wood, and Womack) dissented on the basis that the court should have addressed one of the arguments regarding the merits of the malpractice case to avoid a petition for review and retrial:

Inexplicably, the majority has forsaken a key component of our appellate procedural due process by refusing to address the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to the locality rule. If successful, this issue would obviate the need to address the only issue that the majority deigned to address. The disposition of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is, of course, reverse and dismiss.

As was made very clear to the court during oral arguments, if this court were to hold that there was insufficient proof of a statutory element of a medical-malpractice suit in Arkansas, as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-114-206(a), it would end the case. Thus, if this court found merit in that issue, the denial of Dr. Bandy’s right to a jury trial would therefore be moot. While, in my view, the jury-trial issue would be subject to a mootness exception and therefore should be addressed, that is beside the point.

Today’s disposition represents the antithesis of judicial economy. Not only does it require a new jury trial, which may not be necessary, it invites a petition for rehearing in this court, which I fully anticipate.

I dissent.

Id. at 7.

Pursuing a medical malpractice/personal injury or other civil claim in Arkansas can be full of difficult issues. People looking to pursue such claims should consult with an Arkansas Civil Attorney as soon as possible. Contact our firm by phone, email, or our contact form if you would like your potential case evaluated.